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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Climate change poses a threat to several internationally 
recognized human rights, including the rights to food, a 
livelihood, health, a healthy environment, access to water 
and the rights to work and to cultural life. Actions taken 
to mitigate and adapt to the adverse impacts of climate 
change have to be centred on human rights. In negotiations 
for a binding international climate change instrument, 
nation states have been called upon to fully respect human 
rights in all climate-related actions. As important as this 
demand is, there is also the need to describe and plan how 
human rights can be integrated into international, national, 
subnational and corporate climate change strategies. This 
paper analyzes a few examples of national, subnational 
and corporate climate change policies to show how they 
have either enshrined human rights principles, or failed 
to do so.
It is argued that existing national, subnational and 
corporate climate change policies make little direct 
reference to human rights norms. This paper examines 
the question that naturally arises: how are human rights 
concerns being integrated into those policies? This paper 
also examines the challenge of integrating human rights 
principles in climate change actions. It first looks at climate 
change in the context of larger environmental issues that 
have considerable human rights consequences. Then it 
highlights the challenges of bridging the normative gap 
in international law — in other words, the inadequate 
legal provision for protection of human rights with regard 
to environmental rights in general, and climate change 
more specifically, and how this might guide domestic 
climate change action. The paper concludes that climate 
change policies, if they are to respect all human rights, 
must actually use human rights language to articulate 
adaptation or mitigation measures.
INTRODUCTION
In the 2010 Cancun Agreement to the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), it was provided that 
“Parties should, in all climate-related actions, fully respect 
human rights” (UNFCCC 2011). The same document also 
affirmed the rights-based safeguards to be applied when 
financing and undertaking activities under the Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+) framework. These safeguards, it must be noted, 
were informed by the experiences of local and indigenous 
peoples under UN-REDD, which became REDD+ as a 
result of the bottom-up efforts to catalyze human rights 
protection for the most vulnerable, whose interests were 
apparently being ignored up to that time in the UNFCCC 
process (Kant, Chaliha and Shuirong 2011; Doolittle 2010). 
On October 17, 2014, mandate holders under the special 
procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
jointly addressed an open letter to the UNFCCC parties, 
calling upon them “to include language in the 2015 climate 
agreement that provides that the parties shall, in all 
climate change-related actions, respect, protect, promote, 
and fulfill human rights for all” (Mandate-Holders of the 
Human Rights Council 2014). This call departed noticeably 
from the language of “respect” in the Cancun Agreements 
mentioned above, as well as from the COP 21 negotiating 
text identified below, to prescribe additional substantive 
state responsibilities (“protect,” “promote” and “fulfill”) 
in designing an international climate agreement.
As well, in the Streamlined and Consolidated Text the 
preamble noted that, “Parties should ensure in all climate 
change related actions full respect of all human rights” 
(UNFCCC 2015). The text further recognized that, “all 
actions on climate change shall significantly contribute to 
the post-2015 development agenda of the United Nations 
with a particular focus on human rights, good governance, 
gender equality and the needs of particularly vulnerable 
groups” (ibid.).
As the COP21 Paris meeting draws closer, there are 
indications that a binding agreement may not be achieved, 
and the language of human rights may be excluded 
altogether from whatever agreement is reached. Rather than 
the streamlined text mentioned above, a set of three tools 
have been issued by the co-chairs of COP21, anticipating 
the most likely scenario for the final negotiations. The first 
is a draft of issues that could form an agreement in Paris. 
This draft is full of the language of “vulnerabilities.” Not 
even once does it mention “human rights.” The second tool 
is a draft of issues that could form part of the decisions, with 
one extended preambular paragraph that emphasizes “the 
importance of respecting and taking into account human 
rights, gender equality, the rights of indigenous peoples, 
intergenerational concerns, and the needs of particularly 
vulnerable groups, including women, children and 
persons with disabilities, when taking action to address 
climate change….” The last tool deals with provisions 
whose placement requires additional explanation among 
the parties. This tool includes a paragraph that, while it 
emphasizes “full respect for all human rights,” singles out 
gender responsiveness/equality, the right to development 
and the rights of indigenous peoples for specific 
recognition. 
The inconsistent back-and-forth treatment of human rights 
concerns in the pre-COP21 documents might seem to 
suggest that the issue has not been considered with a great 
deal of seriousness, at least not from the perspective of the 
negotiating parties. This may well be the case, or it may 
be an unintentional oversight. Regardless, any potential 
for a lack of attention to and absence of the human rights 
component in the COP21 deliberations has to be carefully 
followed to ensure negotiators do not drop the ball on the 
matter and thus negatively affect the outcome. Whether 
described in the language of vulnerabilities or articulated 
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in more explicit human rights terms, a combined reading 
of all the pre-Paris documents indicates a concern for 
human rights principles in climate change strategies. 
Those principles should not be ignored in any outcome or 
agreement, even if they are only general declarations of 
goals. Making them essential, operational elements of the 
agreement would require further articulation of specific 
norms and the identification of actionable activities.  
CONNECTING CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS
Climate change puts humanity at risk and has “clear and 
immediate implications for the full enjoyment of human 
rights” (Kravchenko 2010; Atapattu 2002; Humphreys 
2010). Combatting climate change therefore requires 
actions that are focused on its impacts on human rights. 
Equally as important as this expectation of integrating 
human rights principles into climate change action is the 
need to spell out explicit ways this expectation can be 
met in international, national, subnational and corporate 
climate change strategies. 
According to 2014 research undertaken by the Mary 
Robinson Foundation, only 12 countries (mainly from 
Central America, Europe and Asia) mentioned the link 
between climate change and human rights in reports 
transmitted to the UNFCCC and the Human Rights Council 
(HRC). In specific terms, however, the report showed that in 
information presented before the HRC under the Universal 
Periodic Review, 45 countries (in Central America, Africa, 
Europe and Asia) referred explicitly to the human rights 
impacts of climate change. At the UNFCCC, 49 countries 
(in Africa, Central and South America, Europe and Asia) 
clearly mentioned human rights in their submissions to 
that body (Mary Robinson Foundation 2014). Neither the 
United States nor Canada figured in any of these reports. 
It is unclear if this is because the statistics do not cover 
the two countries’ reporting period or their reports did not 
actually make reference to human rights. 
These figures show that even though human rights 
implications are central concerns of at least some countries 
in their climate change action plans, the number of 
countries showing such human rights sensitivity is still too 
low to warrant optimism. Given that 193 member states 
of the United Nations and 195 countries have ratified 
the UNFCCC, the low numbers from the Mary Robinson 
Foundation reveal that the situation leaves a lot to be 
desired. The language of the reports themselves is equally 
important to understanding the challenges. Referring to 
the human rights impacts of climate change in general 
terms is clearly not the same as stating explicitly how the 
human rights framework can be incorporated in climate 
change mitigation and adaptation measures. There is, 
therefore, the challenge to move from broad plans to the 
specifics of how these goals can be achieved. 
As a practical strategy in this regard, the International Bar 
Association Climate Change Justice and Human Rights 
Task Force (2014) has suggested the “greening” of existing 
human rights by “urging human rights bodies to recognize 
that climate change impedes the full enjoyment of at least 
some, if not all, human rights.” Yet questions remain as to 
how specific human rights targets can be achieved under 
the climate change regime. What would such general 
statements about “respecting” or “greening” human rights 
amount to when broken down to fine details? What does 
it mean to respect all human rights in this context? What 
human rights are to be respected? And is there a distinct 
language with which to express respect for human rights 
in climate change action?
The possibility of addressing climate change through 
international human rights law has come under intense 
scrutiny in recent years (Shue 2014; Roht-Arriaza 2010). 
There is increasing consensus that under a general theme 
of “climate justice,” existing international human rights 
norms could be deployed in the fight against climate 
change — to the extent that the impact of climate change 
violates any of those norms (Caney 2010). Applying those 
norms should not depend on an international agreement 
specifically linking climate change and human rights. 
Instead, the link could be made by assessing the ways 
that climate change affects particular human rights norms 
already recognized under international human rights law. 
As has been rightly argued, “linking the climate change 
negotiations and structures to existing human rights norms 
enables States to use indicators and mechanisms anchored 
in the well-established human rights system to address 
the challenges posed by the changing climate” (Center for 
International Environmental Law 2011). Establishing this 
link is by no means an easy task (Doolittle 2010). The next 
section explores this challenge.
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE CLAIMS 
Within the existing literature, the right to a clean 
environment is sometimes differentiated from the human 
right to remedies accruing from the consequences of 
climate change. John Knox, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights and the Environment, is among the 
scholars who have made this distinction. In a recent essay, 
he divided his discussion on the international regime 
for the protection of the environment within the human 
rights framework into two parts. In the first part, he 
examined the relationship between human rights law and 
environmental protection in a general sense. In the second, 
he focused specifically on the human rights implications 
of climate change (Knox 2015). This distinction must be 
understood if the contours of human rights claims based 
on climate change are to be effectively traced.
CLIMATE CHANGE ANd HUMAN RIGHTS: HOW? WHERE? WHEN?
BASIL UGOCHUKWU • 3
There are therefore two lines of inquiry to examine. The 
first is to determine whether a human right to a healthy 
and sustainable environment has been acknowledged 
in international law (Francioni 2010). The second is 
to discover whether “climate law” is in the process of 
becoming a new international law regime (Mayer 2013). 
As will be explained below, there is no doubt that the 
first question can be answered in the affirmative. This 
is the case even though the protection of the right to a 
healthy and sustainable environment has not developed 
in a straightforward trajectory within the international 
human rights law-making system. As one scholar asserts, 
the relationship between international environmental law 
and international human rights law is a complicated one 
(Fisher 2013). The concept and understanding of a human 
right to a healthy environment seems to have developed 
slowly and tentatively.
In 1972, the Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment spoke of the fundamental right to 
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life “in an 
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity 
and well-being,” asserting that the present generation 
bears “a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the 
environment for present and future generations.” This 
coupling of the “ecological and human rights approaches 
to environmental protection” saw little progress over the 
next 20 years (Francioni 2010). By the time of the Rio Earth 
Summit in 1992, the human rights language had softened 
considerably, shifting away from a focus on people to 
“nature” and referring to human beings merely as “the 
central concern of sustainable development…entitled to 
a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature” 
(ibid., 45). 
It has been suggested that the main concern of the Rio 
Declaration was “the conjugation of environmental 
protection with economic development, not the 
safeguarding of human rights through enhanced 
environmental protection,” and that the reconciliation of 
economic growth with environmental protection remains 
the focus of environmental diplomacy, even after the world 
adopted the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent negotiations 
on global warming (ibid.). While there has been significant 
international action on the climate change front, the fact 
that the draft agreement for COP21 talks of a “facilitative, 
non-punitive, non-adversarial and non-judicial” 
framework for international climate change governance, 
detracts substantially from the original goal of agreeing a 
binding international instrument. Granted, there are some 
non-binding human rights documents (such as the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights) that could deal with climate change-related 
concerns. If the UNFCCC process ends up with a similar 
non-binding document, it could hardly be described as a 
success because it defeats the stated goal of producing a 
binding agreement. It bears noting that following more 
than two decades of the COP process, and since the 2007 
Kyoto Protocol, global emissions of greenhouse gases have 
increased rather than abated, signifying a more urgent 
situation.
The next section examines the normative gap in the 
international legal system, the lack of protection that has 
fed doubts that climate change will be treated as a human 
rights concern with claimable, legal and enforceable 
rights related to its impacts. While some of the gaps in 
law highlight the lack of a substantive basis for claiming 
violations on human rights grounds arising from climate 
change, others show only the procedural limitations of 
making such claims in specific legal or judicial contexts. 
It is argued that there is an urgent need to strengthen 
procedural safeguards where they already exist. The 
larger, more important challenge is to develop substantive 
normative standards for the recognition of human rights 
in climate change policies at the international, national, 
subnational and corporate levels. 
BRIDGING THE NORMATIVE GAP IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
Current international human rights law does not 
recognize the impacts of climate change as the basis for 
human rights claims, which means that there is a gap in 
the international normative system. In other words, while 
it is generally accepted that climate change has negative 
impacts on a range of human rights, the international legal 
system has not yet specifically assigned responsibility for 
the causes of climate change on the basis of human rights 
norms. For this reason, Eric Posner (2007, 1931) has argued 
that “There is…no international human right to be free 
of global warming or pollution per se.” In his view, “the 
claim that individuals have an international human right 
of some sort that is violated by the emission of greenhouse 
gases, and that such a right should be vindicated in human 
rights litigation, is not normatively attractive.” Even 
where there are declarations and agreements asserting the 
importance of the environment, or even the right to live 
in a healthy environment, such declarations do not create 
an international human right to a healthy environment 
(Posner 2007; Atapattu 2002). Proponents of this viewpoint 
believe this is the very definition of the normative 
gap. While climate change infringes on human rights, 
international law does not provide for how this harm can 
be redressed. A climate change governance mechanism to 
address this gap is therefore needed.
Equally important, an effective climate change governance 
strategy requires international collaboration. This is because 
“although the causes of climate change are located within 
political borders, their effects clearly transcend them” 
(Trebilcock 2014, 119). Two separate challenges come from 
this reality. The first is that there is, as yet, no international 
agreement on the best possible means of tackling climate 
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change. While the UNFCCC does exist and serves a 
specific purpose, it is considered to fall short of what is 
required to tackle the challenge; hence, the COP meetings 
that are aimed at achieving a deeper consensus. An 
alternative framework such as Jutta Brunnee and Stephen 
Toope’s “interactional theory” of the international system 
could be helpful (Brunnee and Toope 2000), at least to the 
extent that it breaks down the borders of the traditional 
understanding of sources/legitimacy of international law. 
Under this theory, what qualifies as international law in 
the climate change context depends on whether a wide 
enough range of actors and participants created it through 
processes of mutual construction, and not only because it 
fits traditional boundaries of international legality such as 
treaties or custom (ibid.).
The second challenge is that the lack of international 
consensus makes it more difficult to frame the harmful 
impacts of climate change in the language of international 
human rights. As Knox notes, none of the United Nations 
human rights treaties enshrines a right to a healthy 
environment or stipulates an environment of a certain 
quality to meet a minimum threshold of healthfulness 
(Knox 2015, 2). This concern could be addressed, as in the 
first challenge above, by reference to Brunnee and Toope’s 
interactional theory. Yet an awareness of the great efforts 
being mobilized to ensure that a binding international 
agreement is reached reveals the limitations of this theory 
and raises further questions.
One such question is, what is the impact of the lack of 
international agreement for international climate change 
governance? Treaties are generally considered effective in 
building international law on the environment and other 
subject matters. By no means are treaties the only source 
of international law, however. According to article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (annexed to 
the Charter of the United Nations), international law can 
arise from customary international law, meaning “general 
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a 
sense of legal obligation” (Goldsmith and Posner 1999). 
Additional sources of international law include general 
principles of law and judicial decisions and teachings of 
legal scholars. 
Does the absence of an international environmental and 
climate change treaty mean a diminished role for other 
sources, such as customary international law (Bodansky 
1995)? Not necessarily. Climate change governance is an 
area in which the suggestion that treaties take priority 
over other sources of international law cannot plausibly be 
supported. This is especially true given that the existence 
of a treaty is not always an effective guarantee that states 
will comply with its provisions. 
The simple answer to this question is that climate change 
as a global problem is multidimensional in nature and 
therefore requires a diversity of normative mechanisms 
to fight it. While those mechanisms may be treaty based, 
other sources of international law, such as custom and 
state practice, should not be discounted. In addition, and 
on the basis of the interactional theory mentioned above, 
attention has to shift further to alternative understandings 
of international legal legitimacy incorporating the activities 
of a diverse range of actors generating norms based in 
large measure on rhetorical processes of discussion and 
dialogue (Brunnee and Toope 2000). 
There is, for example, a growing incidence of climate 
change litigation in various domestic legal jurisdictions. 
This can provide evidence of customary international 
law through state practice. In these cases, combinations 
of human rights and non-human-rights norms, such as 
remedies under tort law, have been deployed (Cox 2014; 
Schatz 2009; Newell 2008). Those parties that turn to 
domestic litigation, often under human rights norms that 
may not be explicit or clear, are acting partly in response 
to weaknesses in the international regime (Hunter 2009). 
Such litigations are significant in that they create a strategic 
rhetorical process to deal with human rights and climate 
change in the domestic context. 
In addition, there are many international statements and 
declarations that, while not directly addressing climate 
change as a human rights issue, could be employed 
interpretively to achieve that goal. Examples are the 1986 
United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development 
and the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration on the Right to 
Development, for instance, recognizes the right to self-
determination (article 1), which could be compromised 
by loss of land arising from flooding or erosion. It also 
enshrines the right of access to basic resources, education, 
health services, food and housing (article 8), all of which 
may be placed at risk by changes in traditional livelihood 
arising from climatic factors such as change in disease 
vectors and high-intensity storms (Center for International 
Environmental Law 2015). Similarly, the Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples contains several 
provisions under which climate change impacts could 
become human rights questions. That declaration focuses 
on the right to self-determination and adds the rights of 
indigenous populations to autonomy and self-government 
(article 4), these rights also oblige states to obtain the free, 
prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples before 
adopting measures that may affect them (article 19). Yet 
these rights and obligations are often disregarded in the 
climate change context. 
Because litigators may have already accepted Posner’s 
assertion that current international human rights norms 
do not directly recognize claims arising from the impact 
of climate change, it may be tempting to concentrate on 
norms implied or derived from other sources rather 
than on explicit human rights norms. That could be a 
mistake, however, because the right to a remedy based 
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on such claims has been implied from other normative 
sources. The provisions of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have in some 
instances been expanded to support these claims. It has 
been argued, for example, that while there is nothing in the 
human right to life and to own property that directly refers 
to the environment, “the existence of rights such as these 
has justified in certain circumstances the need to protect 
the environment” (Fisher 2013). The major regional human 
rights instruments also directly or implicitly enshrine the 
right to a healthy environment (Shelton 2009; Osofsky 
2010). The relationship between the harms resulting from 
climate change and the definition of a healthy environment 
is one more issue open for debate.
Much as some regional human rights instruments recognize 
environmental rights in their provisions (Kravchenko and 
Bonine 2008; Shelton 2009), some national constitutions 
have incorporated these rights as well. As of 2012, 177 of 
the 193 member states of the United Nations recognized 
the right to a healthy environment in one form or another 
(Boyd 2012). This is true of African countries (Bosek 2014; 
Madebwe 2015; Van der Bank and Van der Bank 2014) and 
European countries (Falletti 2015). Not only do some Latin 
American constitutions incorporate environmental rights, 
they further provide that addressing climate change is a 
responsibility of the state (Aguilar and Recio 2013). 
In those countries whose constitutions enshrine the right 
to a healthy environment, this is done either in explicit 
terms, as in Portugal, Zimbabwe, Spain, among others 
(Boyd 2012, 5) or through objectives and principles, as in 
the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of 
State Policy of Nigeria (Amechi 2010; Ijaiya and Joseph 
2014; Temitope 2010; Musa and Bappah 2014). Under 
the latter process of enshrinement, the right to a healthy 
environment is only a policy vehicle. It cannot be legally 
enforced in the way that civil and political rights can. 
Despite the global push for recognition of the right to a 
healthy environment, there are still exceptions — those 
countries Boyd refers to as “laggards” — whose domestic 
constitutions have ignored the right altogether (Boyd 2012, 
4). Holdouts include Australia, Canada, China, Japan, 
New Zealand and the United States. 
International instruments and domestic constitutions 
are two different vehicles through which environmental 
human rights norms can be developed. When those 
mechanisms contain provisions related to climate change, 
an expectation is that the principle of “respecting all 
human rights” will be included and adopted. The major 
gap in the international system is that there is no specific 
instrument addressing climate change. It is hoped that 
such an instrument will emerge from COP 21, and that it 
will enshrine provisions that are sensitive to the human 
rights dimensions of climate change. Any such agreement 
should be codified in unambiguous language, and target 
not just procedural guarantees but also the substantive 
human rights that are affected by climate change. With 
regard to the rights to life and water, for example, the focus 
could be on how shifts in climate and precipitation affect 
access to water. 
At the domestic level, it has also been the practice lately 
of some national, subnational and corporate entities to 
design policies that deal directly with the challenge posed 
by climate change. As in international instruments or 
domestic constitutions, these policies must respect human 
rights in their provisions. Yet, as climate change is known 
to affect different states differently, there will be a need 
for contextual analysis, to determine what the potential 
human rights implications of climate change are for each 
state and to frame policies so they address those differing 
implications. How this is being done in practice is the 
question addressed in the next section.
EXAMPLES FROM NATIONAL, 
SUBNATIONAL AND CORPORATE 
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
This paper is only one part of the overall research 
that analyzes climate change policies and legislation 
established by national, subnational and corporate entities 
for language that meets the imperative of “respecting” all 
human rights. Although some, like the mandate holders 
who serve as advisers under the Special Procedures of 
the UN Human Rights Council, go beyond the language 
of “respect” to include the need to “protect, promote, and 
fulfill” the human rights of all, this paper focuses on the 
COP 21 requirement to “respect.” This is done with an 
awareness that while “respect” can describe demands 
made upon corporate entities, it may not sufficiently 
capture the duties of states required to do more than respect 
rights in climate change policies and laws. The preliminary 
conclusion from reading some of these policies and laws is 
that they avoid the use of direct human rights language. 
Instead, they tend to employ alternative expressions that 
may be normatively valuable, but are still not as effective 
as more explicit human rights terms. 
Canada’s Action on Climate Change is one such document. It 
provides a summary of how the Canadian government has 
responded to the threat of climate change (Government of 
Canada 2015). It cannot be described as a plan, policy or 
strategy. The document speaks to what the government 
has done, not what it intends to do. It describes what 
has been done to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
the government’s efforts to facilitate the production of 
clean energy technologies and green infrastructure. It 
also states how government action is helping Canadians 
adapt to climate change, as well as the government’s role 
in developing an international climate change agreement. 
The document does not mention human rights, although 
one might deduce a concern for human rights in the use 
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of the word “fair” in the claim that “Canada is encouraged 
by the progress made towards a new, fair and effective 
international climate change agreement that includes 
commitments from all major emitters.” 
Earlier versions of Canadian climate change plans or air 
quality plans included the Climate Change Plan for Canada 
(Government of Canada 2002), launched in 2002 under 
Jean Chretien’s Liberal government. It announced itself as 
a plan that would “enable Canada to successfully meet its 
climate change objectives,” which, at the time, included 
supporting the UNFCCC, ratifying the Kyoto Protocol 
and fulfilling Canada’s obligations under the protocol’s 
terms. Yet, in its details, the plan struggled to balance 
these goals against the pressures of assuring the economic 
competitiveness of Canadian business and industry. 
The plan noted some key principles in which 
responsiveness to human rights should have been 
embedded. It never once used the term “human rights” 
but did mention “vulnerabilities.” It also included a few 
provisions from which some procedural human rights 
guarantees could be deduced. There was, for example, a 
clause aimed at “promoting public participation through 
education and outreach,” as well as another on the fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits and burdens of realizing 
climate change goals (ibid., 9). Specifically in relation to the 
Arctic, the plan recognized that the region is particularly 
sensitive to changes in climate. It noted that the continued 
decline of Arctic sea ice will not only “affect the global 
climate system, but [will have] significant impacts on the 
environment, well-being and lives of the peoples of the 
circumpolar region, including Canada’s North” (ibid., 
51). The plan offered no further specific strategy for 
incorporating these serious human rights concerns. 
Following their victory over the Liberals in 2006, the 
Conservatives under Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
abandoned the 2002 plan and replaced it in 2007 with what 
they described as a Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions 
(Government of Canada 2007). As the title suggests, the 
agenda was no longer a comprehensive climate change 
plan but instead a regulatory framework for the narrower 
subject of air quality. It included “mandatory and 
enforceable reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases 
and air pollutants that will deliver tangible benefits to the 
health of Canadians and their environment” (ibid., iii). In 
its preface, the framework noted that climate change is 
a global issue “of major concern to Canadians” (ibid., 1). 
It stated that the concentration of greenhouse gases due 
to human activity is producing changes in the climate, 
including “altered wind and precipitation patterns and the 
increased incidence of extreme weather events, droughts, 
and forest fires.” The framework emphasized how climate 
changes “could imperil the way of life of vulnerable 
communities around the world and here in Canada.” 
Further, it stated that: 
Air pollution is a significant threat to human 
health and the Canadian environment. Each year, 
smog contributes to thousands of deaths [right to 
life]. Other air pollution problems, such as acid 
deposition, threaten biodiversity, forests and fresh 
water ecosystems [rights to food, water, livelihood, 
health]. In order to address the real concerns of 
Canadians suffering from the health effects of 
air pollution [right to health], and to clean up 
Canada’s environment, the government must act to 
reduce emissions of air pollutants. (Government of 
Canada 2007) [Notes in brackets are the author’s.]
Thus, it is evident that this framework had an awareness 
of the human rights concerns that could arise from climate 
change, even if that specific language was again lacking. 
The argument up to this point, however, is that using terms 
from which human rights may be implied is not as effective 
as actually indicating that a framework, plan or strategy 
should be implemented in a way that supports human 
rights (as well as detailing how it will do that). The 2007 
framework was especially lacking in this regard. Because 
the framework targeted only air pollution, however, it 
cannot be described or analyzed as a comprehensive 
climate change plan.
In the absence of a nationwide Canadian climate change 
strategy, some provincial governments have stepped up 
to lead local action. Some of the provinces have climate 
change plans suited to their specific contexts. Of these, 
the strategies for British Columbia and Quebec have 
been widely acknowledged. In November 2015, Alberta 
announced a province-wide carbon tax plan as part of its 
climate change policy (Giovannetti and Jones 2015). For its 
part, Ontario spent the early months of 2015 workshopping 
its Climate Change Strategy, which mostly uses, rather 
than “human rights,” the language of “vulnerabilities” 
(Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change 2015). 
While focusing on these vulnerabilities, the plan seeks 
also to involve those facing climate risks in building 
appropriate resilience. Like California’s plan (discussed 
below), the Ontario plan acknowledges the diversity of 
experience, knowledge and information on the subject. 
Accordingly, the province intends to take advantage of the 
traditional knowledge and distinct experiences of its First 
Nation and Métis communities in crafting the next steps 
for addressing climate change. In Ontario, as in California, 
there is more inclination to deliberative, participatory 
and consultative rights. These are all procedural rights 
and thus they follow the international pattern, previously 
discussed, of imagining the human rights dimension of 
climate change only in procedural terms.
California’s 2009 Climate Adaptation Strategy speaks not 
only in terms of “vulnerability” but also of the “public 
stakeholder process” of communication and engagement 
and of “environmental justice.” The California strategy 
obliged all sectors engaged in its development to 
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work closely with all stakeholders and to incorporate 
environmental justice concerns and mainstream them 
into all actions wherever possible. Further, it claimed that 
the state’s climate adaptation strategies could assure for 
all Californian residents the opportunity to live, learn 
and work without regard to race, age, culture, income or 
geographic location. It specifically noted that interactions 
with California’s “Indian Tribes” were to be respectful and 
on a “government-to-government basis.” The indigenous 
community’s traditional knowledge was highlighted as 
having a role in combatting climate change (California 
Natural Resources Agency 2009).
Although there is no nationwide climate change policy 
in Canada or the United States, that does not seem to be 
the case in many states in the Global South. Governments 
in these nations have been actively developing climate 
change action plans intended for operationalization on 
a national scale. The plans developed by Rwanda and 
Nigeria are used as examples in this paper. 
Rwanda’s Green Growth and Climate Resilience: National 
Strategy for Climate Change and Low-Carbon Development 
was released in 2011. Produced for a developing country, 
Rwanda’s climate change agenda uses terms such as 
“poverty and vulnerability,” “food and water security,” 
“social protection” and “education and empowerment,” 
but never “human rights” or “housing rights” or “social 
and economic rights” (Republic of Rwanda 2011). Although 
human rights principles could be implied from the terms 
used in the plan, this is still less authoritative than if the 
language used were more pointed in describing its basis 
in human rights. 
The Nigerian climate change strategy document seems to 
be on a higher level in terms of its human rights content. 
It uses the language of vulnerability, local knowledge and 
experience, social marginalization and poor governance. 
Each of these descriptions obviously has human rights 
elements. But the Nigerian plan is also the only one among 
those discussed here that actually uses the words “human 
rights” in the text. It states that policies, programs and 
strategies recommended for climate change adaptation 
in the country should be guided by the five interrelated 
principles of the United Nations Development Group, 
that is, “a human rights-based approach, gender equality, 
environmental sustainability, result-based management, 
and capacity building” (Government of Nigeria 2011). 
In one area at least, the Nigerian plan further defines 
what a human rights-centred approach might mean in 
practice. It not only established well-articulated goals 
for climate change adaptation for vulnerable groups 
(“to develop programs that support and assist…to 
harness opportunities”), but also had clear strategies 
(“create awareness…provide basic training…adapt 
government programs…adapt public facilities…
intensify immunization…retrain health workers…
[and] encourage [non-governmental groups] to provide 
social welfare services”). Furthermore, it makes specific 
recommendations in terms of policies, programs and other 
measures by identified actors that can help vulnerable 
groups adapt to climate change.
In recent times, the corporate sector has also been involved 
in climate change-related activities, and some companies 
have developed environmental sustainability plans with 
climate adaptation and mitigation as critical components. 
As with the national and subnational plans discussed 
above, it is important to ask how corporate environmental 
and climate change plans are integrating human rights 
concerns. While these corporate plans come under the 
broad rubric of the “environmental,” they could encompass 
significant climate change elements as well.
Canada’s Bank of Montreal (BMO), for example, has what 
it calls an Environmental Policy and Action Plan with a 
particular sensitivity to the “problems posed by climate 
change,” which problems, it says, need prompt and strong 
action. Only once does this plan mention “human rights,” 
and that is under the summary of the bank’s five-program 
“ECO Strategy,” specifically in the section dealing 
with procurement. There it states, as its overarching 
objective, the employment of “a rigorous process that 
will ensure BMO takes into account environmental and 
social considerations during the procurement process.” 
It then notes that the program “takes a wider view of the 
concept of sustainability to include social concerns (for 
example, labour practices and human rights) in addition 
to environmental issues” (BMO Financial Group 2008). 
Power generation and distribution companies are often 
implicated in the climate change debate because their 
activities contribute significantly to greenhouse gas 
emissions. In addition, these companies frequently carry 
on their business in proximity to indigenous communities 
whose rights and interests over the land, culture and 
resources have to be included in corporate accountability 
measures. It is obvious, therefore, that these companies 
should conduct their activities in a participatory and pro-
rights manner to gain the trust and support of the members 
of such communities. Specifically, if power companies have 
designed climate change or other environmental policies, 
the human rights of the communities affected or likely 
to be affected by their businesses should be integrated 
into such policies. To see the extent to which this is being 
carried out in practice are the following analyses of several 
Canadian power companies: Imperial Oil and ExxonMobil 
(operating as a single company), Hydro One and Enbridge.
The environmental policy document of Imperial Oil and 
ExxonMobil is less explicit than that of BMO. It speaks 
first to both organizations conducting their business “in a 
manner that is compatible with the balanced environmental 
and economic needs of the communities in which they 
operate.” The policy then states the goals of complying 
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with applicable environmental laws and regulations, 
preventing incidents and controlling emissions and 
wastes, as well as communicating with the public on 
environmental matters and sharing their experience 
with others to facilitate improvements in performance 
(Imperial Oil and ExxonMobil n.d.). It would appear that 
the standard adopted is minimalistic — limited to ensuring 
compliance with environmental law — and there is little 
to indicate a commitment to address climate change more 
holistically. 
Hydro One is Ontario’s largest power transmission and 
distribution company. Its terse environmental policy is so 
general that it does not once mention climate change, let 
alone human rights. To infer either of these from the very 
broad terms used in this one-page policy would require 
imaginative reading between the lines. The policy simply 
states that the company will manage its operations “in 
an environmentally responsible manner” and (much like 
Imperial Oil and ExxonMobil above) “will comply with 
all applicable environmental legislation and…voluntary 
commitments.” While committing to designing and 
operating its facilities in a manner that prevents pollution, 
the company also pledged to “manage any adverse 
environmental impacts” that may result from those 
activities. As well, it undertook to “manage significant 
environmental risks and integrate environmental 
considerations into [its] decisions” (Hydro One 2015).
Hydro One is particularly concerned about its relationship 
to the First Nations and Métis peoples, since it owns assets 
in reserve lands as well as within the traditional territories 
of these communities. The company states that it is 
committed to developing and maintaining relationships 
with First Nations and Métis peoples that demonstrate 
mutual respect for one another. It also recognizes that First 
Nations and Métis peoples and their lands are unique 
to Canada, with distinct legal, historical and cultural 
significance. It therefore committed itself to working with 
First Nations and Métis peoples in a spirit of cooperation 
and shared responsibility (ibid.).
For its part, Enbridge has a climate change policy 
document that acknowledges that “dealing with climate 
change is a shared responsibility with implications for 
citizens, governments and business.” The major focus 
of the policy is on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, its most significant prescription in this regard 
is that government policies should be “tailored to our 
energy-intensive and energy-based economy [which] must 
enable us to remain competitive while making meaningful 
reductions to GHG emissions.” Apart from the emissions 
reduction and pro-economy concentration of this policy, it 
is only mildly sensitive to the social dimension and makes 
no mention of human rights at all. Very little, if anything, can 
be inferred from its statement that “Enbridge is prepared to 
work with all levels of government and key associations to 
encourage the energy industry to be a proactive participant 
in the development and implementation of climate change 
solutions” (Enbridge n.d.).
Both the Hydro One and Enbridge policies use very broad 
and general descriptions, and no direct references to 
human rights. The Hydro One policy, however, contains 
words from which some human rights principles could be 
inferred, if one were to read between the lines. Its promise 
to conduct its activities in an environmentally responsible 
manner could convey a range of possible meanings. It could 
mean that the company would carry out environmental 
assessments before implementing new projects and also 
doing those projects in a manner that limits their impacts 
on the environment. It is conceivable that, when this is 
the case, a host of procedural and substantive human 
rights could be protected in the process. The company’s 
concern for the interests of indigenous peoples in affected 
communities is particularly salient in this regard. Its 
recognition of the uniqueness and historical significance 
of First Nations and Métis peoples’ lands suggests that the 
company is also concerned for the protection of indigenous 
cultural and traditional rights. 
The Enbridge policy, by contrast, though it mentions 
climate change specifically, contains insufficient detail to 
warrant the inference of a commitment to human rights. 
The company’s pledge to work with governments and 
associations toward climate change solutions is clearly 
not enough, although an optimist might see a desire to be 
consultative and participatory. If this is the case, it could 
be concluded that at least the company is interested in 
ensuring that procedural human rights expectations are 
respected in its strategy.
Most of the goals contained in the corporate policies 
addressed here could be interpreted to include some 
human rights expectations. For example, environmental 
laws could plausibly enshrine human rights norms. 
Preventing oil spills and controlling emissions would 
seem to be proactive ways of preventing tragedies that 
could have human rights implications. Conducting public 
communications on environmental matters also fits the 
strategy of using public dialogue to engage communities at 
risk of environmental disruptions, providing an important 
procedural means to protect human rights. However, if 
the exact human rights objectives of these companies in 
these policies can be discovered only by deducing them 
from inexact, unspecific language, it means more clarity 
is needed. This can only be achieved by ensuring that the 
policies use actual human rights language. 
CONCLUSION
As the parties to the UNFCCC gather in Paris in December 
2015 to adopt the final version of the international climate 
change framework, at the heart of the negotiations should 
be how human rights principles can guide policies aimed 
at mitigating the challenges of climate change. It is likely 
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that the final document will require state parties to ensure 
all human rights are “respected” in their climate change 
actions. If that is the case, specific details of how human 
rights principles can inform climate change strategies will 
have to be worked into policies at the national, subnational 
and corporate levels. There is therefore an immediate need 
to translate the text proposal in ways that integrate human 
rights into practical actions in specific climate change 
policies.
As discussed, many countries, especially in the developing 
world, have developed climate change policy documents 
to guide their national response actions. There are other 
states, such as Canada, that do not have documented 
national policies, but have nevertheless submitted 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions aimed 
at achieving the objectives of the framework convention. 
Corporations are also showing sensitivity to climate 
change issues, either as part of their corporate social 
responsibility strategies or as a risk consideration in 
investment planning. Either by design or omission, many 
of these policies do not use the language of human rights. 
If the international climate change regime is to achieve its 
objectives of reducing emissions and building resilience, 
this gap has to be corrected quickly. An international 
agreement or instrument may not anticipate the entire 
gamut of ways in which climate change could be a human 
rights concern. It may therefore be acceptable if such 
an agreement or instrument makes broad and general 
provisions. Where this is the case, it is left to domestic 
policy makers to translate such broad international 
commitments to actionable domestic strategies. In doing 
so, domestic policy makers should ensure that the actions 
chosen for implementation actually address climate 
change in a manner that is sensitive to human rights. 
The language of these policies — international, domestic, 
national, subnational and corporate — should leave no 
doubt that this is the case by using the language of human 
rights in their provisions.
Applying this to Canada, for example, would require an 
understanding of the various ways that climate change 
could have an impact on human rights throughout Canada. 
Collective information gathering and sharing could create 
a platform for meaningful action. If the public education 
is conducted in a collaborative manner — involving 
national, subnational and corporate stakeholders, 
indigenous communities and other relevant stakeholders 
— each stakeholder could then design their climate change 
policies in a fashion that recognizes the human rights 
issues relevant to their sector and the reality of Canada’s 
domestic context. This approach should apply to all other 
countries as well.
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Climate Change Discussion Paper 2015, as part of 
a province-wide public consultation process by the 
Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change. 
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A Climate Change Litigation Precedent: Urgenda 
Foundation v The State of the Netherlands
CIGI Papers No. 79 
Roger Cox
In June 2015, The Hague District Court rendered 
a historic judgment in the climate case of Urgenda 
Foundation v The State of the Netherlands, stating 
that the Dutch state commits “a tort of negligence” 
by not adequately regulating and curbing greenhouse 
gas emissions. Roger Cox, lead counsel for Urgenda, 
presents his account of the case and the ruling, 
which marks the first successful climate change 
action founded in tort law — and a landmark 
precedent for such cases in other jurisdictions 
around the globe. 
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v THE STATE OF THE 
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ROGER COX
The End of the Beginning: Paris COP 2015 
 
CIGI Special Report 
David Runnalls
The Paris Conference of the Parties 2015 is designed 
to produce the next round of climate change action. 
There are reasons to believe that the chances for 
success at the multilateral level are better now 
that they were before, but even under the most 
optimistic scenarios, Paris will not be the end of 
the negotiations. The Paris summit will be crucial to 
maintaining the momentum that has been building 
in the private sector and civil society on the issue of 
climate change. 
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Climate Change Solidarity and Resolve: Post-
Paris Strategy, Policy and Law to Translate 
Ambition into Action
Commentary 
Oonagh Fitzgerald
Senior fellows and researchers within CIGI’s ILRP 
will contribute to creating effective climate change 
strategies, policies and laws consistent with global 
Sustainable Development Goals in the areas of 
addressing equality and climate justice; facilitating 
global sharing of innovation and prosperity;  and 
promoting global cooperation and solidarity.
With the recent federal election, Canada is poised to make a fresh start in addressing climate change. Research and experimentation 
has already occurred at the subnational (provincial and municipal) level and within civil society, which will support the new 
federal government in making ambitious commitments on behalf of Canada — commitments that Canadians are resolved 
to meet or exceed. CIGI’s International Law Research Program (ILRP)1 has identified key international, transnational and 
domestic legal approaches that will help to implement successfully an ambitious new climate change agenda.
The twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), being held in Paris from November 30 to December 11, is expected to articulate guiding principles and 
set the level of global ambition around climate change. The real work, however, will come afterward, in translating general 
ideas into strategies, policies and laws that actually change behaviour. This will have to be done at international, transnational, 
national and subnational levels, with appropriate coordination across jurisdictions as necessary. 
The global crisis of climate change cannot be solved without taking a holistic approach that integrates and supports the global 
Sustainable Development Goals2 (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September of this year. Consistent 
with the SDGs, the ILRP’s research on climate change strategies, policies and laws can be grouped under three themes:
• addressing equality and climate justice; 
• facilitating global sharing of innovation and prosperity; and 
• promoting global cooperation and solidarity. 
This commentary summarizes how senior fellows and researchers within CIGI’s ILRP will contribute to creating effective climate 
change strategies, policies and laws consistent with and supportive of global SDGs. 
EQUALITY AND CLIMATE JUSTICE
The problem: Indigenous people everywhere are seeing their right to food security and traditional culture increasingly 
adversely affected by climate change. Future generations will bear a heavier, potentially intolerable, burden if the present 
generation does not take adequate steps to address climate change. While climate change is making the general population 
vulnerable, it is important to consider the particular impacts felt by those who already are most vulnerable: women and 
girls, the elderly, disabled and impoverished persons. Small island nations will disappear entirely if climate change is 
not checked. SDGs 1–5 focus on basic human rights issues long enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights, and 
subsequent conventions. Goal 16 acknowledges that rights are empty unless citizens can participate in decisions affecting 
them and can enforce their rights through an accessible system of justice. 
Thus, indigenous rights, intergenerational fairness, protection of vulnerable populations and global equity issues need to be 
taken into account in designing international, national and subnational strategies to address climate change (Bianca Jagger, 
Basil Ugochukwu). At the international level, this means humanitarian solutions must be mobilized for populations displaced 
from their homes by climate change-related disasters.  
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